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AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLLUTION DISPUTES IN TAIWAN: CASES OF
“SELF-RELIEF”
TADAYOSHI TERAO
During the late 1980s and early 1990s in Taiwan, people’s protests against environmen-
tal pollution often took the form of “self-relief,” meaning that they attempted to fight
polluters using their own resources, without relying on legal or administrative proce-
dures. Why did such an extreme form of dispute become so widespread? What institu-
tional changes did these movements bring about? These questions are analyzed using
the analytical framework of “law and economics.” Our research shows that self-relief
functioned to a certain extent as a means of realizing quick compensation for victims,
and for reflecting the opinions of local people concerning development projects; in addi-
tion, it served to promote the formulation of law and administrative systems. However,
as it was based on direct negotiations between the parties concerned, the outcome of
each dispute only reflected the transient balance of forces, and the experience gained in
negotiations was not accumulated as a social norm.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN the latter half of the 1980s, serious and frequent environmental disputes beganto occur in Taiwan. Public protest against emissions of pollutants or against
development projects which might cause serious pollution often took the form
of “self-relief” (zili-jiuji) movements, in which people attempted to fight the prob-
lems using their own resources.1 In antipollution self-relief movements, victims (or
potential victims) frequently negotiated directly with the enterprises responsible
for pollution, and very few attempts were made to solve the problems through legal
procedures. Self-relief actions by victims involved face-to-face confrontations and
sometimes physical force. The use of force by victims’ groups in such cases some-
times caused halts in operations of the polluting factories.
These self-relief movements have included a wide variety of collective protests
by citizens against administrative authorities or business enterprises. All social
movements were banned in Taiwan under martial law, and even after martial law
1 “Self-relief” (self-help) is a legal term, but in this paper we will not use it strictly according to legal
terminology.
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was lifted in 1987, self-relief movements were still considered illegal in some re-
spects. Most cases of self-relief against environmental pollution, especially during
the process of democratization, were unorganized, spontaneous actions by local
people against polluters or development projects. In this paper, we will focus on the
antipollution self-relief carried out under such unorganized people’s actions. We
believe that these local, unorganized self-relief actions should be distinguished from
social movements carried out by urban intellectuals (Terao 2002, pp. 266–68).
We will begin with the question of why an extreme form of settling disputes, i.e.,
through the self-relief movement, spread so widely in Taiwan in the 1980s. We will
analyze this question using the analytical framework of “law and economics.” Our
conclusions are that the cost of this form of collective protest was decreasing along
with democratization, and that at the same time the Kuomintang (KMT)’s develop-
mental dictatorship had produced an “institutional vacuum” of alternatives such as
legal or administrative ways to solve environmental problems at a lower cost. How-
ever, the self-relief measures did not guarantee a fair and efficient solution. We will
cite two problems of self-relief movements: opportunistic behaviors by both vic-
tims and pollutant enterprises, and solutions through power games.
 The second question is what institutional changes the self-relief movements have
brought since the late 1980s. If a legal and/or administrative system for pollution
prevention and dispute solution were developed and operated at a lower social cost,
it would inevitably replace the solution of resorting to the use of force. We also
analyze the impacts of democratization on environmental movements, including
self-relief. In actuality, self-relief movements undoubtedly induced the expansion
of environmental administration systems, the formulation of environmental laws
and ordinances, and a rapid increase in investments in pollution prevention by the
public and private enterprises. These institutional adjustments are likely one reason
why protests on environmental issues became somewhat milder in the 1990s than
in the 1980s. In addition, the changes in the protest movements can also be attrib-
uted to their own transformation of strategies, as one recent study emphasizes.
In Section II, we will briefly outline the political situation in Taiwan before the
development of democratization in the 1980s, and explain the preconditions for the
eruption of popular discontent concerning environmental pollution in the form of
self-relief movements. In Section III, we will outline how the antipollution move-
ments emerged in the course of Taiwan’s gradual political democratization in the
early 1980s to the lifting of martial law in 1987. We will then focus on some typical
examples of protest movements by local people after 1987 against pollution caused
by public enterprises. In Section IV, we will attempt to provide an analysis of our
first question. Using the framework of “law and economics” or “economic analysis
of law,” we will demonstrate the problems of self-relief movements as well as the
institutional reasons why they prevailed in Taiwan despite their defects. In Section
V, we will examine our second question. We will look at institutional development
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and the change in the protest movements, and then examine the relation between
them. The final section provides a summary and the implications of Taiwan’s expe-
riences.
II. “DEVELOPMENTAL DICTATORSHIP” AND THE BACKGROUND
TO DEMOCRATIZATION
The KMT maintained a dictatorship in Taiwan after moving there from mainland
China. Under the regime, Taiwan achieved phenomenal economic growth. How-
ever, environmental pollution worsened in tandem with rapid industrialization.
Despite this fact, the regime refused to allow people to organize movements to
protest against and negotiate with private big business and administrative authori-
ties.
Taiwan’s dictatorship was an authoritarian regime featuring a one-party system
in which the KMT was integrated with the government. Under this system, the
KMT government, though advocating “liberalism,” enforced martial law and re-
lentlessly suppressed the freedom of speech, assembly, and association. It severely
restricted people’s participation in politics. The KMT dictatorship also implanted a
sense of defeatism in the minds of local Taiwanese people through “white terror,”
meaning constant surveillance of political activities and threats.
In the mid-1970s, anti-KMT politicians began to openly challenge the authori-
tarian regime. General elections were held once every two or three years, and the
KMT government allowed people to elect a small portion of representatives. These
elections offered anti-KMT politicians a limited but very precious opportunity to
express their opinions. Whenever the authorities were suspected of irregularities or
plots aimed at defeating anti-KMT politicians in elections, political disturbances
occurred. The Chungli incident of 1977 was one such popular revolt.
When the United States established diplomatic relations with the People’s Re-
public of China in 1979 and severed formal relations with Taiwan, the legitimacy of
the KMT government was thrown into serious crisis. In place of formal diplomatic
ties, the United States enacted the Taiwan Relations Act, and maintained its politi-
cal and military influence over the island. At the same time, it placed stronger pres-
sure than before on Taiwan to democratize and respect human rights.
The political crisis that resulted from the change in Taiwan’s relations with the
United States stimulated domestic demands for democratization. Despite the
clampdown known as the Militao (Kaohsiung) incident of 1979–80, anti-KMT
politicians continued to expand their influence. Wakabayashi (1992) characterizes
the situation in Taiwan in this period as follows: “in a series of internal and external
political crises, a ‘gap of freedom’ began to open up in Taiwan’s authoritarian sys-
tem” (my translation) (p. 212).
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III. THE EXPANSION OF SELF-RELIEF MOVEMENTS
A. The Rapid Expansion of Self-Relief Movements in the 1980s
Until the end of the 1970s, protests against the authoritarian regime were con-
fined to anti-KMT forces in local assemblies. However, collective protest actions
by nonpermanent organizations outside of the antiestablishment forces began to be
organized in the early 1980s. The antipollution movements are considered examples
of such collective protest movements.
Wu (1990) calls such collective actions “social protests,” and classifies the ac-
tions that occurred in 1983–88 as shown on the Table I. Social protests here can be
considered to substantially overlap with self-relief movements.
The table illustrates first, a remarkable increase of social protests even before the
lifting of martial law in 1987. According to Wakabayashi (1992), the “gap of free-
dom” that was opened up by anti-KMT forces in the development of democratiza-
tion from the authoritarian system was a “kind of common property created in the
space of social disputes” (pp. 198, 228) and was not monopolized by anti-KMT
TABLE  I
NUMBER OF “SOCIAL PROTESTS” BY TYPE, 1983–88
Type 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Total
Livelihooda 89 89 114 116 293 407 1,108
Environment 37 62 39 98 146 200 582
Labor 27 40 85 40 69 296 557
Farmers 3 0 3 2 24 51 83
Antigovernmentb 1 5 7 60 119 136 328
Pan-politicalc 6 6 18 12 34 29 105
Othersd 10 2 8 9 49 53 131
Total 173 204 274 337 734 1,172 2,894
Source: Wu (1990, p. 57).
a Represents self-relief actions against the expropriation of land for the construction of public
facilities, and street vendors’ protests against policing.
b Represents street demonstrations by anti-KMT organizations and the opposition party (Demo-
cratic Progressive Party, DPP), as well as protests against the opposition (mainly the DPP)
by right-wing forces (thirty-one cases in total).
c Represents any political protest other than “antigovernment,” for example, conflicts among
local political factions over local political power and resources, and disputes within profes-
sional organizations over personnel affairs and organizational arrangements.
d Represents movements and actions by groups and organizations which could not be catego-
rized into other types, for example, the New Testament Church Protest (protest against gov-
ernment by a religious group), student movements, veteran mainlanders’ home-visiting move-
ments, women’s movements, indigenous peoples’ human rights movements, consumers’
movements, etc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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forces. These protests in turn widened the gap of freedom, which anti-KMT forces
utilized in reviving mass political protests and street demonstrations.
Second, according to the table, the increase in the number of protests was sub-
stantially accelerated after 1987, when martial law was lifted. The widening gap of
freedom contributed to this acceleration.
Third, the table shows that movements against pollution and in favor of environ-
mental protection held a significant position among the social protests. This indi-
cates that environmental problems were one of the most important contradictions
that Taiwan’s developmental dictatorship produced and could not solve effectively
at that time.
B. The Expanded Gap of Freedom and Environmental Protection Movements
Some statesmen and scholars characterize the turning point in Taiwan’s environ-
mental protection movement as the lifting of martial law in 1987.2 However, anti-
pollution movements did not suddenly spring up in various parts of Taiwan after the
lifting of martial law. Even while martial law was still in place, antipollution move-
ments had developed in various parts of Taiwan, and some were organized move-
ments.
The first popular movements against pollution occurred in 1981. In July of that
year, 116 farmers in Huatan-hsiang, Changhua County filed a lawsuit against eight
brick-baking factories, demanding compensation for long-term damage to their rice
crops caused by smoke. The farmers won the lawsuit, and received NT$1.48 mil-
lion in compensation. However, civil lawsuits, as in this case, did not become the
major way for solving pollution disputes in Taiwan hereafter.
In 1983, people living near an amino acid factory in Linyuan, Kaohsiung County,
used force to block the factory in protest against foul odors and polluted water. As
a result of this movement, the factory was forced to shut down and move to another
location. This is considered the first antipollution self-relief movement in Taiwan
(Terao 1993, p. 179).
The Sankuang Agricultural Chemical incident, which occurred in Tali-hsiang,
Taichung County, in 1982–86, signaled a turning point in Taiwan’s antipollution
2 One example is Hsieh Chang-ting, a leading statesman of the Democratic Progressive Party who
has participated in some environmental movements since the 1980s. His understanding (Hsieh
1992) was that before 1987, such movements were led by intellectuals and lacked grassroots sup-
port. Without any long-term perspective, they were localized, accidental, and passive antipollution
movements. A change began to be seen in the political situation in the latter half of an overall
change in the democratization movement, environmental protection movements began to spread to
the grassroots and develop into islandwide movements. After 1987, as mass movements were “lib-
eralized,” middle-class people, women, farmers, workers, students, and people from all walks of
life began to participate in such movements, which were thus no longer passive self-relief move-
ments, as they developed into positive environmental protection movements with a long-term per-
spective. It was after the lifting of martial law in 1987 that powerful antipollution movements
promoting environmental protection and with widespread influence began to develop in Taiwan.
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movements, in that it was organized. Since 1967, Sankuang Agricultural Chemical
had operated a factory in Ninhua village, Tali-hsiang, manufacturing agricultural
chemicals, including insecticides, herbicides, germicides, and other chemicals.
People in the vicinity of the factory protested against its emission of irritating gases
and discharge of toxic water. In 1985, the residents discovered a buried water dis-
charge pipe and launched a protest. In response, the Department of Environmental
Protection (predecessor of the Environmental Protection Administration of the Ex-
ecutive Yuan, central government) ordered the factory to close. The factory man-
agement resisted, but was compelled to promise that the factory’s operations would
be suspended by July 1986, a year and a half after the order. In 1986, during this
dispute, the Taichung County Pollution Prevention Association was established as
Taiwan’s first legal private antipollution, environmental protection organization.3
The Sankuang Agricultural Chemical incident is seen as having made a strong im-
pact on the development of antipollution organizations and environmental protec-
tion movements in various parts of Taiwan (Hsiao et al. 1998; Terao 1993).
In 1985, Du Pont announced a project to construct a titanium dioxide plant in an
industrial estate in Changhua County. Although the plan had been approved by the
Ministry of Economic Affairs, it was suspended and finally canceled in March 1987
due to an opposition movement launched by people in Lukang, where the industrial
estate was located. It was Taiwan’s biggest-ever foreign direct investment project at
the time, representing an investment of U.S.$160 million. The Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs approved the project only thirteen days after the application was
filed, making it obvious that no proper environmental impact assessment (EIA) was
carried out. The movement against Du Pont’s plan represented a turning point in
that for the first time, an antipollution environmental protection movement had a
significant impact on Taiwanese society (Reardon-Anderson 1992).
Under the martial law regime, people had to be prepared to pay great costs and
make large sacrifices when launching antipollution movements. It can be said that
these initial efforts paved the way for the upsurge in such movements after martial
law was lifted.
C. The Lifting of Martial Law and Antipollution Self-Relief
After the lifting of martial law in 1987, there was a major increase in cases in
which protesters resorted to physical force when pressing enterprises to cut back on
3 Until the late 1980s, when the government relaxed its strict control over private social organiza-
tions, people could not establish any formal social organizations without its permission. Even if the
purposes were nonpolitical, the government did not allow private social activities that were not
controlled by the KMT. It was especially cautious about network type organizations, which could
mobilize resources at a islandwide level (Terao 2002). According to Chang et al. (1992, pp. 89–91,
135–37), about 75 per cent of antipollution and antidevelopment self-relief activities were con-
ducted collectively, relying on informal social relations such as cooperation among local-commu-
nity people or relatives.
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or suspend their operations, and demanding large sums of money in compensation.
In many cases the targets of the protests were public enterprises, because they mo-
nopolized many sectors of the heavy and chemical industries that tended to be the
causes of pollution. The Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC), which was the
largest public enterprise and which monopolized oil refineries and petrochemical
materials, was most often attacked. In this subsection, we will focus on two pollu-
tion-related disputes involving CPC.4
1. Taiwan’s Fifth Naphtha Cracking Plant
As shown in Table II, protests against construction plans increased drastically.
Of plans that were subjected to protests by local people, plans by public enterprises
made up more than half. The movement against CPC’s plan to construct Taiwan’s
Fifth Naphtha Cracking Plant was typical of the disputes that occurred prior to the
implementation of industrial projects in Taiwan. The background to this opposition
movement was popular discontent with pollution due to the lack of proper pollution
prevention measures by existing oil refinery plants. Oil and gas leakages were ev-
eryday occurrences at Kaohsiung oil refinery, where the Fifth Naphtha Cracking Plant
was planned to be constructed, and people in the neighboring area had suffered for
many years from air pollution and noise, as well as oil seeping into their well water.
In July 1986, CPC made public its plan to construct Fifth Naphtha Cracking
Plant, with an annual production capacity of 400,000 tons of ethylene, in the com-
pound of its Kaohsiung oil refinery. The plan was made to cope with the obsoles-
cence of Taiwan’s first and second ethylene plants in the compound. The original
TABLE  II
NUMBER OF “ENVIRONMENT”-RELATED COLLECTIVE ACTIONS BY OBJECTIVES, 1983–88
Objective 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Total
Anti–construction plan
(by public enterprises) 2 1 3 16 43 19 84
Anti–construction plan
(by private enterprises) 1 8 1 17 9 19 55
Antipollution 19 12 21 51 59 95 257
Anti–garbage dump 16 38 12 11 33 35 145
Conservation and policya 0 0 0 0 1 10 11
Anti–nuclear power 0 0 0 0 2 9 11
Others 0 0 0 0 0 7 7
 Total 38 59 37 95 147 194 570
Source: Chang et al. (1992, p. 81).
a Indicates numbers of protest movements related to nature and ecology conservation and
movements seeking proper environmental policies and legislations.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 For the details of each pollution dispute, see EPA (1994, 2000a, various issues).
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plan called for completion in 1992. At the end of 1986, however, people living in
the area around the compound launched a movement to oppose the construction of
the fifth plant. Their pent-up indignation erupted after the lifting of martial law, and
they continued to block the main gate of the refinery with barricades for about two
years until the autumn of 1990.
On May 6, 1990, a referendum was conducted in the Houchin district near the
refinery, to ask the residents whether or not they approved of the construction of the
proposed plant. Of the 7,616 persons who cast their ballots, 59.1 per cent (4,499
persons) expressed opposition to its construction, while 38.1 per cent (2,900 per-
sons) approved starting negotiations with CPC. Between 1987, when the opposi-
tion movement started, and the time of the referendum, CPC had donated about
NT$4 billion to the Houchin district for the construction of public facilities, and the
Ministry of Economic Affairs of Executive Yuan and CPC had established a com-
pensation fund of about NT$1 billion.
In September 1990, the Ministry of Economic Affairs gave CPC permission to
go ahead with the construction without regard for the opposition by people in the
neighboring area and the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). It took
four years for the plan to be implemented after the initial announcement. Opera-
tions at the First Naphtha Cracking Plant, which was constructed in 1968 and had
become superannuated, causing damage to people in the area due to its pollution,
were suspended immediately after work began on the fifth plant. The fifth plant is a
large-scale project, requiring a total investment of NT$15.3 billion. A sum of NT$2.4
billion, accounting for about 16 per cent of the total construction cost, is being
earmarked for measures against environmental pollution. It was also decided that
NT$1.5 billion should be transferred to a fund established by the local authorities
to provide compensation to local residents (Terao 1993, pp. 158–61).
This forcible launching of construction work was due to the tight supply-demand
situation of petrochemical materials and the central government’s desire for large-
scale investments, which were expected to stimulate domestic demand. At the same
time, the government believed it necessary to solve the problem of the construction
of the plant, in order, first, to encourage the privately owned Formosa Plastic group
to abandon its plan to move into mainland China by building petrochemical plant
there, and second, to promote the construction of Taiwan’s first private naphtha crack-
ing plant by the group (the Sixth Naphtha Cracking Plant) inside Taiwan. Politi-
cally, Premier Hau Pei-tsun, who had been the Chief of the General Staff and had
just taken office in May 1990, took a less tolerant stance toward social movements
compared to his predecessor. For social movements, including environmental move-
ments, the two years of Hau’s cabinet were a reactionary period (Ho 2000, chap. 5).
2. The Linyuan incident
The Linyuan incident is a representative ex-post-facto movement aiming at gain-
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ing compensation for pollution caused by an accident. It was a very successful one
from the standpoint of the local people concerned, considering the large amount of
money paid in compensation, and also because the local residents received exemp-
tions from responsibility for the illegal acts they committed.
The incident began with an accident that occurred in September 1988, at the
Linyuan petrochemical complex in Kaohsiung County, centered on the Linyuan
plant of CPC. Heavy rain caused contaminated water to leak from the reservoir
tank at the water treatment plant. The direct cause of the incident was the reservoir
tank’s insufficient capacity to handle wastewater. Residents and eel farmers in seven
villages near the complex started a self-relief movement in October demanding
NT$2.4 billion in compensation. On October 11, some of the residents forced their
way into the plant and demanded that it suspend its operations. The plant was forced
to shut down in the early morning of October 13. Negotiations started between the
residents and the central government’s Ministry of Economic Affairs with the me-
diation of the member of the Legislative Yuan (parliament) elected from the dis-
trict, and the negotiations were brought to a successful conclusion on October 15.
The eighteen enterprises operating in the complex agreed to pay a total of NT$1,305
million in compensation. This amount was the highest ever for such a case. This
movement was epoch making in that: (1) victimized residents resorted to physical
force to halt the plant’s operations; (2) the enterprises paid compensation to indi-
vidual victims; and (3) the agreement expressly stated that residents would not be
held legally responsible for their acts.
The Linyuan experience, together with the movement against the construction of
the Fifth Naphtha Cracking Plant, symbolized the rapid progress of antipollution move-
ments after the lifting of martial law (Terao 1993, pp. 161–62; EPA various issues).
IV. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLLUTION DISPUTES
A. Economics of Environmental Pollution Disputes
Before analyzing self-relief movements in Taiwan, we will present an analytical
framework for environmental disputes using “law and economics.” In the first place,
the main cause of environmental problems is the fact that there is no incentive on
the part of private enterprises operating under market mechanisms to bear the costs
of utilizing environmental resources (renewable natural resources such as air and
water). In this case, an excessive amount of environmental resources are used, and
the damage caused by pollution cannot be compensated at all. In microeconomics,
this inefficiency of resource allocation is called “market failure” due to (negative)
“externality.”
Environmental pollution can be reduced by government interventions, such as
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indirect regulation through a pollution tax, or direct regulation on emissions through
a “command and control” approach. But, government interventions are not always
effective, and do not always achieve efficient resource allocation. According to Coase
(1960), if there is no transaction cost in a market transaction, inefficiency in the
allocation of resources due to externality, as in the case of environmental pollution,
should be removed through voluntary negotiations between the parties concerned
(victims and victimizers in the case of environmental pollution). In the framework
presented by Coase, if the victims of environmental pollution can compensate the
polluter for economic losses, they will ask the polluter to reduce emissions of pol-
lutants by, for example, reducing production activities or through the introduction
of pollution prevention equipment. The resulting resource allocation of the negotia-
tions should be efficient. In the real world, positive transaction costs arise from the
necessity to organize many victims, demonstrate a cause-and-effect relationship
between pollution and damages, etc., and sometimes it exceeds the gains from mutual
negotiations between parties concerned. Thus, in such cases, voluntary negotiation
cannot be realized.
By specifying the ownership of a resource which has scarcity value, transaction
costs can be reduced, since an individual economic agent who wants to use it does
not need to negotiate with others who also want to utilize the resource, but only
needs to negotiate with its owner. The owner allows the individual economic agent
offering the best terms to use the resource. To ensure that scarce resources are uti-
lized effectively through the functioning of decentralized market mechanisms in a
world with transaction costs, the specification of ownership can be effective. How-
ever, in many cases it is difficult to specify the ownership of environmental re-
sources such as air and water.
In addition to such difficulties, the asymmetrical nature and uncertainty of infor-
mation make it difficult to solve the problem of “externality” through voluntary
negotiations. In many cases, where victims have less information-gathering ability
than the pollution-causing enterprise, solving a dispute through fair and voluntary
negotiations is not possible. In particular, victims are at a disadvantage in gathering
information on and acquiring technological knowledge about the actual production
process in the factory concerned, compared with the pollution-causing enterprises.
Furthermore, polluters themselves normally do not have complete information con-
cerning the damage they are causing to the environment. Uncertainty due to natural
phenomena such as meteorological conditions and difficulty in making predictions
due to incomplete information are always factors in negotiations concerning envi-
ronmental disputes. Those factors make it difficult to show a cause-and-effect re-
lationship of pollution problems. This incompleteness and uncertainty of information
tends to lead both victims and victimizers to resort to opportunistic actions. Also,
the transaction costs become very large in cases where the effects of the utilization
of the environment are widespread and a large number of victims need to be orga-
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nized to negotiate with a pollution-causing enterprise. Liabilities on polluters and/
or government regulations on pollution emission could also reduce pollution. But,
in many developing countries, the effectiveness of such instruments is questionable.
The self-relief movements involved in environmental disputes in Taiwan repre-
sent cases of “voluntary negotiations between the parties concerned.” In cases of
negotiations in the real world, there is asymmetry, incompleteness and uncertainty
of information. The transaction costs are thus high, so it is difficult to rearrange the
misallocation of resources.
In order to reduce social losses in such situations, the following means are sug-
gested: (1) instituting an ownership structure that will help smooth negotiations;
(2) reducing negotiation and transaction costs sufficiently to allow victims to start
negotiations, and achieving a socially efficient allocation of environmental resources
through proper negotiations; and (3) minimizing the incompleteness and uncer-
tainty of information in negotiations in order to reduce the inclination of the parties
concerned to resort to opportunistic behaviors.
Providing an appropriate legal system can simplify procedures and reduce trans-
action costs in negotiations concerning the utilization of environmental resources.
For instance, liability rules can provide comparable results to ownership institu-
tion. Also, if the principle of solving disputes in court using legal precedents is
presented in advance, the parties concerned can skip negotiations on the method for
solving their dispute and begin concrete negotiations over compensation from the
outset. Mediation by administrative authorities in disputes can also reduce transac-
tion costs in negotiations and uncertainty of information, by presenting scientific
data, which could be local “public goods,” to the parties concerned, and by filling
the gap between victims’ and victimizers’ information-gathering capabilities.5
5 In Japan, there were cases where local government, representing the interests of local residents
who did not have sufficient information-gathering capability, concluded agreements with enter-
prises on pollution prevention while acting as the representative of a local population with its
backing. Those are called “Pollution Prevention Agreements.” It is possible to interpret such cases
as efforts by local governments and their technical staff to overcome the asymmetrical nature of
information and minimize the gap in bargaining power between enterprises and local people in
order to lower transaction costs. When there is a need for a neutral organization of some kind to
mediate between the parties concerned, local governments appear to have an advantage over the
central government, in that they can better gather information on the nature of local environmental
problems and possible countermeasures. It is more efficient from the standpoint of cost, as well, to
establish a decentralized system under which local governments can respond to local problems,
than for the central government to respond on the basis of information gathered locally. In many
cases, environmental pollution is localized, and it is only after the pollution has spread and large-
scale disputes have erupted that the central government comes to know about it. In places where
environmental administrative systems are not yet well developed and there are limits to administra-
tive capacity in this respect, it takes a great deal of time and money for the central government to
gather relevant information (Terao 1994). In Taiwan, a system of pollution prevention agreements
between local governments and enterprises was promoted by the EPA, but only one example has
been realized so far, between the Ilan county government and a cement factory (EPA 2000a, pp.
187–96).
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B. Analysis of Self-Relief in Taiwan
How can the pollution disputes that occurred so frequently from the early 1980s
in Taiwan be interpreted within the framework of “law and economics” presented
by Coase? Why did environmental movements come to prevail in the 1980s, taking
the form of self-relief featuring direct negotiation between polluters and victims
despite its high cost? This question can be divided into two parts: (1) why did so
many disputes take place in the 1980s? and (2) why did victims choose the high
cost method to protest against pollution?
1. The reasons for the frequent occurrence of environmental disputes in the 1980s
There was a long period in Taiwan after World War II in which the ownership of
environmental resources did not come into question. The amount of pollution was
low, and it is supposed that only rarely were people especially aware of the owner-
ship of the pollution-free natural and living environment. As the economy devel-
oped rapidly and incomes rose sharply, people’s preferences on the living environ-
ment and natural resources changed drastically. It was only when people became
clearly aware of the pollution of environmental resources, against the background
of the rapid expansion of economic activities, that they came to be interested in the
ownership of environmental resources and their right to live in an pollution-free
environment.
Government regulations on emissions could have improved environmental qual-
ity, but were neither strict nor effective at that time. While the central government
had neither any awareness or concern over individual local pollution problems, the
local governments did not have sufficient capacities to control pollution. For ex-
ample, most local governments did not have independent sections concentrating on
the pollution problems, they had few specialists with scientific knowledge, and
they had only limited budgets.
It is believed that under the KMT’s developmental dictatorship regime, the trans-
action costs incurred in protesting against pollution and negotiating with enter-
prises, administrative and jurisprudential authorities were prohibitively high. A ban
on social movements under the developmental dictatorship regime step by step be-
gan to weaken in the mid-1980s. As the transaction costs for direct negotiations fell
gradually due to this process, it was expected that gains (or reductions of losses
caused by pollution) through negotiations would exceed the transaction costs, and
an incentive would be created for victimized people to assert their ownership of (or
right to utilize) environmental resources and start negotiations, even at the cost of
taking risks under the developmental dictatorship regime. Transaction costs for di-
rect negotiations on the part of victims fell sharply after the lifting of martial law,
and self-relief movements mushroomed in various parts of Taiwan.6
6 We need to consider the “free rider problem” in Mancur Olson’s “collective action” argument. The
THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES296
2. The selection of strategy induced by “the institutional vacuum”
Even after the lifting of martial law, direct negotiations with polluting enter-
prises using physical force continued to be illegal in many respects. The result was
that transaction costs were still higher than if the disputes had been resolved through
appropriate systems, whether legal, administrative, or other. However, the develop-
mental dictatorship regime was structurally deficient in terms of its capacity to
address local problems such as environmental pollution, and an institutional vacuum
remained in place for some time during the democratic transition. People facing
serious environmental pollution problems felt that the only possible course open to
them was direct negotiations with polluters.
According to a study by Hsiao et al. (1988), out of 108 cases of antipollution
self-relief activities which occurred from 1982 to 1988, protesters made petitions to
administrative authorities (local governments) in some form or another in 69 cases,
instituted lawsuits in 20, and demanded negotiations with the attendance of admin-
istrative authorities in 28. Protesters did not initially resort to direct negotiations
with polluters or organizations promoting development projects, but in many cases
decided that they had no alternative when they realized that the administrative mea-
sures they had attempted to utilize were totally dysfunctional.
In the period of the authoritarian regime, the Legislative Yuan (parliament), ad-
ministration of justice, mass media, and local governments did not function as so-
cial channels for solving pollution disputes. A majority of the members of parlia-
ment, most of whom were members of the KMT, had held their seats since its
arrival in Taiwan without election. Judicial independence was not maintained, and
people fighting pollution did not place trust in the fairness of the courts. In particu-
lar, in disputes with administrative authorities and public enterprises, they did not
place any trust in legal procedures. Looking at the various kinds of disputes in
Taiwan, the percentage of pollution disputes that have been solved in court is very
low. The government and the KMT controlled the mass media. Local governments
were able to exercise only limited powers and were financially weak. At the same
time, there was no formal administrative mediation system for solving pollution
disputes.
Although this situation started to improve with democratization, the institutional
vacuum basically remained in place during its early stage. At the same time, since
democratization substantially decreased the costs of collective protests in the form
of self-relief, these types of movements prevailed.
3. Problems of disputes resolution through self-relief movements
Self-relief did not turn out to be the best way to efficiently resolve environmental
––––––––––––––––––––––––––
first successful collective action reduces the transaction costs for latecomers to protest collectively
against power. Some scholars called them “political entrepreneurs.” See Olson (1965), Wakabayashi
(1992), Tang and Tang (1997), and Cheng and Schive (1997).
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disputes. First, the possibility of direct negotiations provided by the expanded “gap
of freedom” led people to resort to opportunistic behaviors in the absence of suffi-
cient information, resulting in an inefficient allocation of resources and a large loss
in terms of social welfare. The case described below, involving metal scrap recov-
ery, illustrates the opportunistic behavior of protesters. Second, self-relief move-
ments often became involved in power games against the firms. For this reason,
when the government started to take a stern attitude against environmental move-
ments, they became unable to win their expected compensation.
(1) Metal scrap recovery
Waste nonferrous-metal recovery is a labor-intensive industry aimed at extract-
ing useful metals (copper, gold, etc.), mainly from imported metal scrap, such as
disposed home electric appliances, electric cables, and computers. Most firms op-
erating in this industry are small sized. These firms have been the source of many
cases of water and soil pollution with heavy metals and dioxin.
One incident in which oysters grown in aquaculture farms were contaminated
with copper, causing their color to become greenish, occurred in January 1986 in
oyster farms near the estuary of the Er-ren-hsi River in Kaohsiung County. About
450 hectares of oyster farms were affected, and oyster farmers were obliged to burn
the contaminated oysters and the lattices used for hanging oysters in the seawater.
Initially, the source of the pollutant could not be identified. Oyster farmers decided
that the Hsingta power plant, operated by Taipower in the neighborhood was the
culprit, and demanded that the power plant pay compensation for the damage.
Through intermediary efforts by members of the Legislative Yuan elected from the
district, Taipower and the Kaohsiung County government agreed to pay NT$10
million each to the victimized oyster farmers. However, Taipower did not admit
responsibility for causing the pollution. Later, research conducted by the Environ-
mental Protection Bureau of the Taiwan Provincial Government demonstrated that
the cause of the pollution was illegal disposal operations by scrap metal recovery
firms near Er-ren-hsi River. However, it was impossible to determine which of the
many operators was responsible. Even if the culprit was found, it was clear that the
operators concerned were incapable of making compensation payments. The oyster
farmers asked the administrative authorities to compensate them for the damage. In
April 1989, the Executive Yuan (central government) paid NT$20 million, and the
Kaohsiung County government and Taiwan provincial government NT$10 million
each, for a total of NT$40 million, to the oyster farmers (Terao 1993, pp. 167–71;
EPA various issues).
(2) The second Linyuan incident and the Talin incident
Around 1990, on top of the change in the government’s attitude toward environ-
mental movements, public opinion turned somewhat against them (Terao 1993, pp.
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180–82; Ho 2000, chap. 5). After it was reported that some protesters had received
large sums of money in compensation, self-relief movements arose whose main
purpose could be seen as to acquire as much compensation money as possible. As a
result, environmentalists came to be regarded as semiprofessional activists or pro-
fessional troublemakers.
After the Linyuan incident in 1988, in which enterprises were forced to pay a
large sum of money in compensation to pollution victims, a similar incident involv-
ing the leakage of wastewater at the same petrochemical complex occurred in May
1989. People near the complex surrounded the plant once again. When members of
the Legislative Yuan intervened to settle the dispute amicably through mediation,
the plant management promised to build a hospital and employ people in the neigh-
boring area on a priority basis, but adamantly refused to make any compensation to
individual residents, notwithstanding the fact that compensation had been paid to
individual victims in the first incident. There was criticism within the government
that the Ministry of Economic Affairs reached a compromise settlement in the
Linyuan incident in 1988 too easily, and that an excessively large sum of money
was paid to individual residents concerned; this may have had an effect on the
way the Linyuan case of 1989 was settled (Terao 1993, pp. 180–81; EPA 1994, p.
204).
Following the second Linyuan case, an accident occurred on May 2, 1992, at
CPC’s Talin plant in Kaohsiung County, with large quantities of steam leaking from
the plant. Residents in the neighborhood surrounded the plant in protest. Research
by the Environmental Protection Administration of the Executive Yuan concluded
that no pollution had been caused by the leakage. However, local residents did not
accept this explanation and demanded that CPC pay NT$1.5 million to a local fund
and NT$0.8 million to each local household. On May 25, local residents surround-
ing the plant clashed with police trying to disperse them, resulting in many injuries
and arrests. In the end, the residents were unable to gain any compensation (Terao
1993, pp. 180–81; EPA 1994, p. 237).
V. DEMOCRATIZATION, INSTITUTION BUILDING, AND THE
CALMING OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES IN THE 1990S
A. Impacts of Democratization
The first effect of democratization was to ensure the freedom of association,
promoting the organization of environmental movements to organize themselves.
Until the lifting of martial law in 1987, the establishment of civil organizations was
severely restricted by the government. The Civil Organization Law controlled civil
organizations, including political parties. When the opposition party DPP, founded
illegally in 1986, was legalized by the amendment of the law in 1989, regulations
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on civil organizations other than political parties were also drastically relaxed. Re-
strictions on establishment were practically abolished, and replaced by a simple
registration system (Terao 2002, pp. 270–75).
Before this amendment, as argued in Wakabayashi (1992), social movements,
including environmental protection movements, and political movements were fight-
ing together, as a result of the limits on opportunities to express their collective
discontent with the KMT regime. Organized political movements and social move-
ments were able to support unorganized self-relief movements utilizing the “open-
ing of political freedom” created by the popular challenges to the KMT regime, and
the latter helped to further widen the space of political freedom. Particularly in the
case of the movements against the Taiwan’s Fourth Nuclear Power Plant construc-
tion plan of Taipower, local communities, activists, and DPP politicians forged a
strong partnership, and worked together to oppose the plan for many years.
After the legalization of civil associations, social movements, including those
for environmental protection, became able to establish civil associations, and some
self-relief associations were organized into local environmental protection associa-
tions. An islandwide civil association for environmental protection, for example,
the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union, was also established after the lifting
of martial law.
Secondly, as the political system was democratized and the opposition party DPP
grew, the relationship between the environmental movements and the DPP started
to change.7 When the DPP began to win significant number of seats in the elections
of the Legislative Yuan and in local governments in the early 1990s, some of its
members began to make efforts to absorb support from a wider range of society in
order to take power in the future, and began to keep a distance from social move-
ments (Ho 2000, pp. 128–35). At the same time, the government was gradually
building institutions to solve environmental disputes. As a result of these changes,
most political and islandwide environmental problems became administrative and/
or local issues.
B. Institution Building by the Government
Viewed from this framework, our conclusion is that the solution of disputes through
self-relief movements produced larger losses to social welfare than would have
occurred if a system for dispute resolution had been in place. It is necessary to
lower the transaction costs for negotiations and narrow the scope for opportunistic
behaviors by the parties concerned by establishing systems for dispute resolution
and compensation to victims, as well as through institutionalized mediation by ad-
7 Many environmental movements have maintained alliances with the DPP because the KMT
government is seen as a common enemy. In particular, their relations were very intimate in the
early stage. As a result, environmental disputes in those days were not only pure social issues but
also very important political issues (Terao 2002, pp. 264–70).
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ministrative authorities. In actuality, efforts in this direction have been made since
the establishment of the Executive Yuan’s Environmental Protection Administra-
tion in 1987 (Terao 1993).
In 1992, the Public Nuisance Dispute Mediation Act was promulgated, drawing
upon the experiences of the Environmental Dispute Settlement Law of Japan, and
organizations were set up to institutionalize administrative mediation in pollution
disputes. From the beginning of 1993 to the end of 1999, “mediation councils” set
up by each municipal and county (city) government accepted applications for 107
cases. Among them, the parties concerned reached agreement in 21 cases, and did
not in 55 cases (13 cases were still ongoing at the end of 1999). Among the 55
unresolved cases, 33 were submitted to the “arbitration council” set by the central
government (the Environmental Protection Administration). Among them, arbitra-
tion decisions on 33 cases had been issued by the end of 1999 (EPA 2000b).
In addition to the administrative mediation system, the government tried other
policy instruments to prevent potential pollution disputes beforehand. For example,
as the environmental policy administration system was established, complaint-pro-
cessing systems by administrative authorities became more extensive, and they were
able to accept many complaints. In 1999, administrative authorities received 93,555
complaints on environmental pollution. The administrative processes resolved at
least some of them before they developed into serious disputes (EPA 2001, p. 369).
Even when the authorities could not prevent problems, they gained detailed infor-
mation on them before they developed into disputes, so that they could quickly
present reasonable proposals for solution.
Moreover, the environmental protection authorities started to conduct research
on the cause-and-effect relationships of pollution incidents, or to evaluate damages
caused by pollution, if requested by the parties concerned. Such government activi-
ties can be considered a kind of public good, which can lessen the asymmetricity of
information-gathering abilities between polluters and victims, and reduce the trans-
action costs of negotiation among parties concerned. The information provided by
the process of environmental impact assessment (EIA) can also be considered as a
form of public goods, which can reduce uncertainty and the transaction costs of
negotiations. Environmental impact assessment is also important in respect to pub-
lic participation.
Many pollution problems which would not have appeared as disputes before the
introduction of the dispute resolution systems might have emerged through a reduc-
tion of the transaction costs. With the resolution of the individual pollution problems
that could have emerged as a result, social welfare as a whole might have improved.
C. The Calming of Disputes
In the late 1990s, the term “self-relief” has appeared with less frequency with
regard to environmental or other social problems. In the media, fierce collective
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protests have become much less common than they were around 1990. Does this
indicate a decrease in environmental disputes?
Figure 1, which is based on data from the EPA, shows that the number of signifi-
cant environmental disputes had already begun decreasing from 1993. Ho (2000,
pp. 142–43) points out that the sudden decrease in environmental disputes in Fig-
ure 1 is too drastic compared to reality, but his estimation also shows that the num-
ber did decrease slightly during early 1990s. He also concurs that there was a calm-
ing of environmental disputes in the 1990s, in that the agitations on the streets
decreased (Ho 2000, pp. 145–46) and introduces the new activities of environmen-
tal movements. He calls this change the ”institutionalization of social movements”
(Ho 2000, pp. 138–41).
What caused the change? Initially, the building of administrative organizations,
laws and regulations, and the implementation of pollution control policies made a
significant contribution. The introduction of extensive pollution control policies in
Taiwan was a response by the government to the frequent self-relief social protests
at that time. Second, owing to political democratization, channels of dispute resolu-
tion other than those of local governments, without capabilities, were diversified,
and potential environmental disputes could be resolved before they became serious
and led to self-relief movements. In addition, Ho (2000, pp. 146–58) emphasizes
changes of strategy by the social movements themselves. According to his research,
in the 1990s environmental movements started to use more diversified strategies. In
the most advanced cases, local people not only protested against development projects
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Fig. 1. Number of Significant Environmental Pollution Disputes, 1987–99
Source: EPA (2001, p. 373)
Notes: 1. For 1987, the number represents those from September to December only.
2. All numbers represent disputes that the central government (EPA) could
identify and recognize the importance of.
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which might destroy the environment, but proposed alternative projects which would
cause lesser damage.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, the self-relief movements brought the following positive and negative
results. Concerning positive results, the following points must be mentioned: (1)
they functioned to a certain extent as a means of realizing quick compensation to
victims in ex-post-facto pollution disputes, and as a means of reflecting the opin-
ions of local people concerning the siting of factories and other facilities in their
before-the-fact movements; (2) they served to promote the formulation of laws and
the establishment of administrative systems for environmental management, result-
ing in the rapid expansion of pollution-prevention measures by businesses; and (3)
together with other social movements, they promoted the transition of the political
system from an authoritarian one to a democracy.
The most important problem they engendered is that self-relief is based on direct
negotiations between the parties concerned, so that the outcome of each dispute
reflected only the transient balance of forces between the parties concerned. Thus
the experiences gained in negotiations did not accumulate to a sufficient extent to
evolve into social norms. This problem became clear when political freedom was
won through progress in democratization, and when self-relief lost its function as
an emergency measure. The frequent outbreaks of self-relief movements discour-
aged private entrepreneurs from making investments in manufacturing in Taiwan.
Furthermore, the solution of disputes through self-relief movements allowed a larger
scope for opportunistic behaviors, and thus cannot be said to be the socially optimal
means of achieving successful resolution. It may be that resolutions could have
been achieved at a lower social cost in a more comprehensive way through an ad-
ministrative system of dispute resolution and relief to victims and by effective envi-
ronmental impact assessments. With regard to institution building, such as law and
administrative systems, it may be said that proper measures against environmental
pollution could have been taken earlier by business and administrative authorities if
there had been a way of reflecting the opinion of people in forms other than self-
relief movements, of which they were many.
In the 1990s, Taiwan’s political system was being democratized, the government
was building institutions such as dispute mediation, and environmental movements
were changing and diversifying their strategies, resulting in a calming of the seri-
ous disputes, which meant the decrease of the self-relief movements. This process
can be seen as a kind of coevolution of political, administrative, and social systems.
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